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Abstract: 
Adult judges were presented with videotape segments showing an infant displaying facial configurations 
hypothesized to express discomfort/pain, anger, or sadness according to differential emotions theory (Izard, 
Dougherty, & Hembree, 1983). The segments also included the infant's nonfacial behavior and aspects of the 
situational context. Judges rated the segments using a set of emotion terms or a set of activity terms. Results 
showed that judges perceived the discomfort/pain and anger segments as involving one or more negative 
emotions not predicted by differential emotions theory. The sadness segments were perceived as involving 
relatively little emotion overall. Body activity accompanying the discomfort/pain and anger configurations was 
judged to be more jerky and active than body activity accompanying the sadness configurations. The sadness 
segments were accompanied by relatively little body movement overall. The results thus fail to conform to the 
predictions of differential emotions theory but provide information that may contribute to the development of a 
theory of infant expressive behavior. 
 
Article: 
Controversy exists as to whether infants experience and express discrete negative emotions. Early views of 
emotional development (Bridges, 1932; Werner, 1948) posited that infants initially respond similarly to any 
negative emotion stimulus. This generalized distress response was gradually superseded by more specific 
negative emotions (e.g., anger, fear) that are differentiated from each other in terms of phenomenology, 
physiology, situational occurrence, and expressive behaviors. 
 
Although several prominent contemporary theorists (e.g., Sroufe, 1979) continue to espouse a differentiation 
model, an alternative developmental theory has recently attracted considerable attention. According to 
differential emotions theory (Izard & Malatesta, 1987), discrete emotions are not preceded by less differentiated 
affective responses. Instead, the same basic emotions seen in adults emerge during infancy according to a 
maturational timetable. Emotional development involves the elaboration of these emotions including their 
association with new eliciting situations, cognitive appraisal processes, instrumental actions, and coping 
behaviors. 
 
Adherents of differential emotions theory propose an innate concordance between facial expression and 
emotion such that each infant emotion has a corresponding discrete facial expression. Furthermore, infant facial 
expressions are automatic manifestations of emotion at least until the age when voluntary control over them 
begins to be exerted. One important implication of this assertion is that both researchers and nonresearchers 
may use facial expressions as a free-standing (necessary and sufficient) measure of infant emotions. 
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Differential emotion theorists have described specific facial configurations proposed to correspond to the 
discrete infant emotions. These configurations are specified in Izard's MAX and AFFEX coding systems for the 
negative emotions of anger, sadness, fear, disgust, and the affective state of physical discomfort/pain. It is 
important to note, however, that Izard's proposals regarding the specific morphology of infant emotional 
expressions are theoretically separable from other tenets of the theory, for example, that discrete emotions exist 
in infants and adults, that emotional development involves emergence and elaboration of discrete emotions 
rather than differentiation, and that there are discrete facial expressions of some form that correspond to the 
discrete emotions in infants. 
 
Several propositions of differential emotions theory have recently been questioned by a number of investigators. 
Regarding emotions in adults, several researchers (e.g., Ortony & Turner, 1990; Russell, 1991; Scherer, 1984; 
Smith & Ellsworth, 1985) have rejected the notion of qualitatively discrete emotions and have proposed that 
adult emotions are both experienced and judged in terms of dimensions or components of the affective 
experience (e.g., pleasantness, arousal, stimulus novelty). 
 
Other researchers believe that discrete emotions are indeed the endpoints of development but disagree with one 
or more proposals about infant emotions that have been presented by differential emotions theorists. For 
example, Oster, Hegley, and Nagel (1992) have argued that the AFFEX coding system does not accurately 
represent discrete negative emotional expressions in infants. In their study, they presented adult judges with still 
photographs of AFFEX-specified infant emotional expressions and with adult emotional expressions as 
identified by Ekman and Friesen. Like Izard, Huebner, Risser, McGinnes, and Dougherty (1980), Oster and her 
colleagues found that judges will indeed choose the theoretically predicted term for the infant expressions if 
they are required to choose a single term from a list of discrete emotions labels. However, when given the 
opportunity to select multiple terms or nondiscrete labels, adults will instead judge these expressions to reflect 
either blends of several negative emotions or "distress." In contrast, when presented with photographs of adult 
emotional expressions, judges choose the single predicted discrete emotion under both procedures. These 
findings suggest that discrete emotional expressions for infants have not yet been identified. More generally, 
Oster (1988) has argued that there is as yet no convincing evidence for differentiated negative emotional 
expressions in infancy. 
 
Camras reached a similar conclusion based on an extensive critical review of the infant expression literature 
(Camras, 1991, 1992; Camras, Malatesta, & Izard, 1991). She pointed to several "orphan phenomena" that can 
not easily be explained by differential emotions theory. First, several expressions specified in Izard's MAX and 
AFFEX coding systems (Izard, 1979; Izard, Dougherty, & Hembree, 1983) are not typically seen in situations 
believed to elicit the corresponding emotion (e.g., surprise and fear expressions in object permanence and fear 
of stranger studies, respectively). Second, other expressions (in particular, the anger configuration) have been 
reported to occur in such a wide range of negative affect situations that their status as expressions of specific 
discrete negative emotions is questionable. Third, the AFFEX-specified discrete negative expressions are no 
more common in some situations than are configurations involving components from several negative emotions 
(Matias & Cohen, 1991). 
 
In a naturalistic study of her infant daughter's expressive behavior, Camras (1992) also found that three 
AFFEX-specified negative expressions (discomfort/pain, anger, and sadness) tended to occur together in the 
same situations and were associated with the waxing and waning of crying episodes. Camras argued that the 
three facial configurations thus do not meet an important criterion for discrete emotion status specified by Hiatt, 
Campos, and Emde (1979): situational specificity, i.e., differential occurrence in emotion-appropriate situations. 
She proposed that the facial configurations instead reflect different variants of distress which, following Bridges 
(1932), she considered to be a qualitatively less differentiated negative affect. 
 
Differential emotions theorists (Malatesta-Magai & Izard, 1991) have argued that Camras' observations 
regarding the situational occurrence of the AFFEX-specified discomfort/pain, anger, and sadness configurations 
merely indicate that infants sometimes experience discrete emotions in non-predicted situations and also (like 
adults) can experience multiple affects in response to the same situation. However, this argument assumes that 
the emotion status of these facial configurations has been validated through some other form of evidence. As 
indicated above, judgment studies of expression photographs have not provided unambiguous evidence to 
support a discrete emotions interpretation of the AFFEX-specified negative expressions. Thus further research 
is necessary to clarify their emotion status and, beyond this, to provide a more complete picture of infants' 
expressive and emotional development. 
 
One important limitation of current research on infant expressive behavior is its almost exclusive focus on facial 
activity. Yet facial expressions produced in vivo are accompanied by body movements and vocal activity that 
may provide important information to both researchers and observers attempting to understand the infant's 
emotional state. For example, possibly the AFFEX-specified facial expressions are accompanied by different 
forms of nonfacial behavior that might support their interpretation as expressions of discrete negative emotions. 
 
In the present study, we examined facial and nonfacial behavior in an attempt to further our understanding of 
three AFFEX-specified facial configurations: the discomfort/pain configuration, the anger configuration, and 
the sadness configuration. In Part 1, we examined emotion ratings obtained from judges who were shown 
expressive displays that included the AFFEX-specified facial configuration, their accompanying body 
movements and, in one condition, their accompanying vocalizations. We reasoned that if judges rated these 
expressive displays in accord with the predictions of differential emotions theory, then one might argue that 
their component facial expressions indeed reflect their AFFEX-specified emotion irrespective of their 
situational occurrence or their judgment by raters presented with decontextualized, disembodied facial 
expressions. In Part 2 of our study, we obtained rater judgments regarding several dynamic characteristics of the 
infant's body movements (e.g., rhythmicity, coordination). We wished to examine these ratings to determine 
whether the body activity accompanying the AFFEX-specified facial configurations for discomfort/pain, anger, 
and sadness seem consistent with theoretically and intuitively based expectations regarding the nonfacial action 
components of these emotions. 
 
Method 
Subjects 
The subjects were 32 undergraduate students (16 males, 16 females) who participated to fulfill a course 
requirement. 
 
Stimulus Materials 
The stimuli were 18 segments of videotape each showing an infant displaying the AFFEX-specified facial 
configurations for discomfort/pain (n = 6), anger (n = 6), or sadness (n = 6). Each segment showed the infant's 
entire body. The segments were extracted from 167 minutes of videotape taken by the first author of her 
daughter at 4 to 9 weeks of age during a variety of routine activities and semi-naturalistic experimental 
interventions. As part of a previous study (Camras, 1992), these tapes had been scored by two coders who 
achieved .90 reliability in the identification of AFFEX-specified expression configurations.
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For the present study, the stimulus episodes were selected by the second author who viewed the tapes in 
chronological order and identified the first six exemplars of each previously identified target configuration that 
met the following criteria: (a) 100% agreement between the authors and previous coders that the expression met 
the AFFEX-specified criteria for identifying the facial configuration, (b) the configuration was displayed for at 
least 1.33 seconds, (c) the configuration was temporally separated by at least one second from other expressions 
that preceded or followed it, (d) the mean episode length for each configuration type was approximately equal, 
(e) at least two freely-moving limbs were shown on camera, and (f) the infant was either in the bath or an infant 
seat. The bath and infant seat contexts were chosen in order to partially standardize the stimulus situation, 
because there were many exemplars of these situations on the videotapes and because the infant had maximal 
freedom of movement in these contexts (see Table 1 for descriptive episode data). The infant's face occupied 
6% to 15% of the screen, making her expression clearly discernible but at the same time maximizing the 
proportion of her body that was also visible to the rater. 
 
 
 
The 18 selected episodes were divided into two sets, each set containing nine episodes (three per target facial 
configuration). Two videotapes were prepared for each set, each tape showing the nine segments in a different 
randomly determined order. Each videotape could be presented with or without the audio channel depending 
upon the stimulus modality condition (video only vs video/audio). 
 
Rating Scales 
Two sets of 7-point scales were used by the undergraduate judges. Each term on each scale was given an 
intensity rating ranging from "1 = not at all" to "7= extremely." 
 
One set of scales consisted of eight emotion terms, seven corresponding to the AFFEX-specified infant affects 
(i.e., happy, surprised, disgusted, afraid, angry, sad, and pained) and one being distressed, an affect term not 
included in differential emotions theory. Distress has generally been considered to be less differentiated than 
emotions such as anger and sadness. 
 
The second set of scales consisted of eight activity terms that potentially could describe types of body activity 
shown by the infant (i.e., active, uncoordinated, jerky, flexed, extended, rhythmic, coordinated, and still). This 
set of terms was generated during group discussion by the authors in which previously published lists of affect 
terms and affect-related terms were inspected. The selected terms do not appear on published lists of affect 
terms (Dahl & Stengel, 1978; Davitz, 1969; Ortony, Clore, & Foss, 1987; Osgood, Suci, & Tannenbaum, 1958) 
and would be considered nonmental, physical states by Clore, Ortony, and Foss (1987). 
 
Procedure 
Each judge viewed one of the four stimulus videotapes and rated each segment using one of the two sets of 
rating scales. Each segment was viewed three times before being rated. For each segment, judges were asked to 
fill out a rating form on which they indicated either how much the infant was experiencing each of the eight 
emotions or how much the infant was showing each of the eight activity characteristics (i.e., "How (x) is this 
infant?"). The rating terms were presented in the same randomly selected order to each judge. All segments 
were viewed either with or without audio accompaniment (video only vs video/audio condition). 
 
Scoring 
Each judge's ratings for each scale set term were summed for the three exemplars of each target expression s/he 
viewed. Thus, 24 scores were generated for each judge (3 target expressions x 8 scale set terms).
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Results 
Two analyses of variance (ANOVA) were conducted to examine differences in subjects' emotion ratings and 
activity ratings across the three target expressions. Each ANOVA included two between-subjects factors (rater 
sex; video vs video/audio presentation) and two within-subjects factors (target expression, n = 3; scale set terms, 
n = 8). 
 
Emotion ratings. The emotion ratings analysis yielded significant main effects for target expression, F(2, 24) = 
34.26, p < .0001, and emotion terms, F(7, 84) = 8.07, p < .0001, and a significant Expression x Emotion Term 
interaction, F(14, 68) = 8.65, p < .0001. No significant effects for rater sex or video vs video/audio presentation 
were obtained. 
 
Simple effects analyses indicated significant differences among emotion term ratings for the discomfort/pain 
and anger expressions but not for the sadness configuration, F(7, 84) = 19.17, p < .0001 for discomfort/ pain; 
F(7, 84) = 4.74, p < .0002 for anger. Follow-up Tukey tests (using Greenhouse-Geisser adjusted degrees of 
freedom, alpha level = .05; see Table 2) indicated that for the discomfort/pain expression segments, the ratings 
of distress were highest and were significantly higher than the ratings for sadness, fear, pain, surprise, and 
happiness but were not significantly higher than the ratings for anger and disgust. For the anger expression 
segments, distress was also given the highest rating and was rated significantly higher than pain and happiness 
but not sadness, fear, anger, disgust, and surprise. 
 
Comparing across the three target expressions, additional simple effects tests indicated significant differences 
among the expressions for each of the eight scale set terms: distress F(2, 24) = 39.60, p < .0001; pain F(2, 24) = 
17.43, p < .0001; anger F(2, 24) = 31.71, p < .0001; sadness F(2, 24) = 8.72, p < .002; surprise F(2, 24) = 4.11, 
p < .03; disgust F(2, 24) = 13.86, p < .0001; fear F(2, 24) = 19.58, p < .0001; and happiness F(2, 24) = 8.43, p < 
.001. Tukey tests showed that similar patterns of ratings were found for the terms distress, pain, and anger, with 
the discomfort/pain expressions being rated significantly higher than the anger segments which were rated 
significantly higher than the sadness segments. Both the discomfort/pain and anger expressions were rated 
higher on sadness than the sadness expression. 
 
Activity ratings. The activity terms ANOVA yielded a significant Expression x Activity Term interaction, 
F(14, 168) = 8.90, p < .0001. No significant effects for rater sex or video vs video/audio presentation were 
obtained. 
 
 
Simple effects analyses indicated significant differences among activity terms ratings for each of the three target 
expressions: discomfort/pain F(7, 84) = 3.29, p < .004; anger F(7, 84) = 3.04, p < .007; and sadness F(7, 84) = 
5.93, p < .0001. Follow-up Tukey tests (see Table 4) indicated that for the discomfort/pain expression segments, 
the ratings for flexed were significantly higher than the ratings for coordinated, extended, and still. For the 
anger segments, the ratings for flexed and jerky were significantly higher than the ratings for still. For the 
sadness segments, the ratings for still were significantly higher than all other ratings. 
 
Additional simple effects analyses indicated differences across the target expressions for several scale set terms: 
active F(2, 24) = 11.17, p < .0004; jerky F(2, 24) = 6.36, p < .006; flexed F(2, 24) = 5.08, p < .02; and still F(2, 
24) = 20.02, p < .0001. Follow-up Tukey tests (see Table 5) indicated that the discomfort/pain and anger 
segments were rated significantly higher for active and jerky and significantly lower for still than were the 
sadness segments. The discomfort/pain segment was also rated significantly higher for flexed than the sadness 
segment. 
 
 
Discussion 
This study found differences in raters' judgments regarding the emotion status and activity characteristics of an 
infant displaying the AFFEX-specified facial configurations for discomfort/pain, anger, and sadness. However, 
these differences were not generally consistent with a differential emotions theory interpretation of their 
affective value. 
 
Subjects who viewed the video segments without hearing the audio component did not differ in their ratings 
from subjects who both viewed and heard the infant's responses. Thus the infant's vocal behavior did not add 
information that altered raters' emotion or activity judgments. 
 
Analyses of the emotion-term ratings revealed that subjects failed to rate the three different facial configurations 
significantly higher for the AFFEX-predicted emotion than for the non-predicted emotions. Of the eight 
emotion terms, pain ranked sixth for the discomfort-pain configurations, anger ranked fourth for the anger 
configurations, and sadness ranked sixth for the sadness configurations. Thus comparisons among emotion rat-
ings for each AFFEX-specified expression type failed to support the hypothesis that the facial configurations 
represented their AFFEX-specified discrete emotions. 
 
Comparisons across the facial configurations for ratings of pain, anger, sadness, and distress similarly failed to 
conform to the predictions of differ- 
 
ential emotions theory. Identical rating patterns were found for three emotion terms (distress, anger, and pain) 
with the discomfort/pain configurations rated significantly higher for all three emotion terms than the anger 
configurations which were rated significantly higher than sadness configurations. For the fourth emotion term, 
sadness, ratings were significantly higher for both the discomfort/pain and anger configurations than for the 
sadness configurations. Thus the AFFEX-specified sadness and anger expressions were not rated higher for 
their predicted emotion than were the distress-pain configurations. In summary, comparisons both within and 
across expressions suggest that the AFFEX-specified facial configurations do not represent their predicted 
discrete emotions in infants, at least as judged by naive raters. 
 
Of particular note, for all six negative emotion terms (plus surprise), the discomfort/pain segments were rated 
higher than the anger segments, which were themselves rated higher than the sadness segments. Only for the 
term happy was this pattern reversed. This suggests that overall the 
 
 
discomfort/pain segments were seen as more intensely negative than the anger segments, which were 
themselves seen as more intensely negative than the sadness segments. 
 
For all three expression types, distress was the negative emotion term given the highest rating. However, the 
ratings for distress were not themselves significantly higher than the ratings for several other emotions. Thus the 
findings do not support Camras' (1991) hypothesis that the three AFFEX-specified expressions all reflect 
distress in contrast to the more discrete negative emotions. However, several interpretations of the rating pat-
terns are possible. For example, the pattern of ratings may indicate that observers perceived the infant as 
experiencing differing blends of negative emotions (including distress) in the different expression episodes. 
This might occur if raters considered distress to be a discrete emotion on par with the other discrete emotions 
rather than a less differentiated form of negative affect as it has been conventionally viewed by researchers 
(e.g., Bridges, 1932; Camras, 1991; Oster et al., 1992). Alternatively, more consistent with Bridges' (1932) 
differentiation model, judges may have rated segments highly for both distress and for the discrete emotions 
they predict will supersede it later in development. Lastly, raters may have interpreted distress as a higher order 
emotion term (i.e., a synonym for negative affect) and provided high ratings for distress when any discrete 
negative emotion or blend of discrete emotions was judged to be present. Future research should address these 
several possibilities perhaps by directly querying raters regarding their interpretation of the rating procedure and 
the emotion term distress. 
 
Turning to the activity term ratings, the data showed that the rank ordering of ratings for the discomfort/pain 
and anger segments were identical. In both cases, the highest ratings were given for the term flexed while the 
lowest ratings were given for the term still. In contrast, for the sadness expression segments, the highest rating 
was given for the term still and significantly lower ratings were given for the other activity terms. Thus the 
pattern of ratings differed for the sadness segments in comparison to the discomfort/pain and anger expression 
segments. 
 
Comparisons of activity term ratings across expression segments also revealed similarities between the 
discomfort/pain and anger segments and differences between these and the sadness segments. In both the 
discomfort/pain and anger segments, the infant was judged to be significantly more active and jerky and 
significantly less still than in the sadness expression segments. The pattern of ratings for the term flexed was 
similar although the differences were not as great. Overall the ratings for body activity suggest that the 
discomfort/pain and anger expression segments involved active, jerky, and flexed patterns of body activity 
while the sadness segments involved less body movement overall. 
 
Regarding the emotion interpretation of the activity term ratings, the findings for the AFFEX-specified sadness 
configurations (i.e., high rating for the term still) seem consistent with theoretically based expectations since 
sadness is considered to be an emotion associated with depressed activity rather than fight or flight. However, in 
light of this, it is particularly interesting to note that emotion term ratings for the sadness segments did not 
suggest that raters judged the infant to be sad. Instead, these ratings suggested that the sadness expression 
segments were not seen to be highly emotional at all. Judges gave low ratings to the sadness segments for all 
emotion terms including sadness. 
 
One possible interpretation of these findings is that the infant was indeed sad during the sadness segments as 
indexed by her low level of body activity but that raters failed to utilize this information to make a correct 
judgment about the infant's emotion. However, an alternative interpretation might be proposed that is more 
consistent with researchers' previous use of raters' emotion judgments as a measure of emotion. According to 
this line of reasoning, our results would indicate that some emotion-related activity differentiation is present in 
the young infant but that further differentiation must take place before the expressions become associated with 
discretely different emotions. The findings of our study do not allow for a definitive test of these hypotheses 
since at present there is no consensus regarding the relative validity of body activity and rater emotion judgment 
as the measure of emotion. Future research might incorporate additional emotion measures (e.g., the 
physiological measures proposed by Levenson, Ekman, & Friesen, 1990) to differentiate between the two 
interpretations. However, with respect to the immediate purpose of the present investigation, it is noteworthy 
that the emotion term ratings, traditionally offered in support of differential emotions theory, were not the 
measures that herein supported the discrete emotion interpretation of the sadness segments. 
 
Regarding the discomfort/pain and anger expression segments, the body activity ratings suggested that the 
nonfacial behaviors accompanying these facial configurations were minimally different with both expressions 
being accompanied by more jerky activity than the sadness expressions. While these ratings might be viewed as 
consistent with theoretically based expectations regarding body activity accompanying pain and anger, they 
would not necessarily be expected to be exclusively associated with these specific discrete negative emotions. 
For example, jerky activity would be considered equally appropriate for the emotion of fear. While additional 
distinctions might be expected between the jerky activity associated with fear vs anger vs discomfort/pain (e.g., 
fight vs flight associated movements), there was no evidence for such distinctions in this study. For example, 
inspection of the videotapes did not suggest that the anger-associated movements were incipient striking 
movements and those associated with discomfort were incipient withdrawal or flight movements. Furthermore, 
the results for the emotion-term ratings also suggested that the activity patterns accompanying the 
discomfort/pain and anger expressions were not qualitatively different and specifically appropriate to these 
emotions. 
 
While this study's findings do not confirm the AFFEX predictions for the facial configurations we examined, 
they do not necessarily indicate that discrete emotions are not present in young infants. Possibly discrete 
negative emotions indeed exist but are represented by facial configurations other than those specified in the 
AFFEX coding system. Alternatively, discrete emotions may be present in young infants but are not 
accompanied by discretely differentiated facial expressions. However, it is also possible that, as proposed by 
Bridges (1932), infants' responses may initially be qualitatively undifferentiated across episodes that will late 
evoke discrete emotions such as anger and sadness. According to this last proposal, the findings of this study 
might be considered to represent an interim point in the differentiation process. That is, at the 7- to 9-week age 
range studied, infants might produce somewhat different forms of negative response as represented by the 
different ratings of emotion and activity terms found in this study. Possibly, further differentiations may 
subsequently take place leading to the discrete negative emotions described for adults. 
 
In conclusion, the results of this study showed that judges perceived the AFFEX-specified discomfort/pain and 
anger configurations to involve negative emotions not predicted by differential emotions theory and the sadness 
configurations to involve relatively little emotion overall. These findings did not support differential emotions 
theory's interpretations of these facial configurations. Similarities were found in the judged body activity 
accompanying the AFFEX-specified discomfort/pain and anger facial configurations. Thus the body activity 
ratings failed to provide support for their status as discretely different emotions. In contrast, there were differ-
ences between the activity accompanying the discomfort/pain and anger configurations and the activity 
accompanying the sadness configurations. However, the specific patterns of activity observed did not lead raters 
to judge the infant's emotion in accord with differential emotions theory. In conjunction with previous research 
(Camras, 1992) indicating that these expressions are not differentiated in terms of their situational occurrence, 
the present study suggests that the AFFEX-specified facial configurations of discomfort/pain, anger, and 
sadness are not expressions of these discrete emotions in young infants. Further research incorporating other 
indices of emotion may yet clarify the correct emotion interpretation of these facial expressions and indicate 
whether negative emotions are discrete or undifferentiated in infants. 
 
Notes 
1. Although the AFFEX-specified sadness configurations were first reported to emerge at 2 months of age 
(Izard & Malatesta, 1987), subsequently Izard, Hembree, & Huebner (1987) observed them in younger 
(2 month old) infants. 
2. Although reliability was properly assessed by examining agreement among the coders who identified the 
AFFEX-specified facial configurations, Cronbach alphas were also computed to examine consistency in 
the raters' judgments of the emotion and activity content of the exemplars for each category. Alphas 
ranged from .22 to .82 for the emotion terms ratings (median = .61). Particularly low alphas (< .40) were 
obtained for the AFFEXspecified distress-pain configurations on ratings of anger; for the AFFEX-
specified anger configurations on ratings of anger, sadness, and pain; for the AFFEX-specified sadness 
configurations on ratings of sadness, disgust, and surprise. Thus judges did not rate the AFFEX-
specified anger and sadness configurations consistently for their AFFEX-predicted emotions. For the 
activity term ratings, alphas ranged from .08 to .76 (median = .50). Low alphas (< .40) were obtained for 
the AFFEX-specified distress-pain configurations on ratings for the terms flexed and still; for the 
AFFEX-specified anger configurations on ratings for the terms flexed, still and jerky; for the AFFEX-
specified sadness configurations on ratings for the terms flexed, still, rhythmic, coordinated and 
extended. Deleting one item raised the alpha level substantially (a > .65) only in the case of the ratings 
for the term still for the anger and sadness configurations. In summary, the exemplars for each 
expression category sometimes differed in their accompanying body activity and their judged emotion 
content. While differential emotions theory might accommodate some differences among exemplars in 
their accompanying body activity, differences in emotion judgments would not be predicted. 
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